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Abstract:
Secure communication is of paramount importance in modern society. Asym-
metric cryptography methods such as the widely used RSA method allow secure
exchange of information between parties who have not shared secret keys. However,
the existing asymmetric cryptographic schemes rely on unproven mathematical
assumptions for security. Further, the digital keys used in their implementation
are susceptible to copying that might remain unnoticed. Here we introduce a
secure communication method that overcomes these two limitations by employing
Physical Unclonable Keys (PUKs). Using optical PUKs realized in opaque scattering
materials and employing off-the-shelf equipment, we transmit messages in an error-
corrected way. Information is transmitted as patterned wavefronts of few-photon
wavepackets which can be successfully decrypted only with the receivers PUK. The
security of PUK-Enabled Asymmetric Communication (PEAC) is not based on any
stored secret but on the hardness of distinguishing between different few-photon
wavefronts.
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Secure communication has become of paramount importance in the internet era. The
security is based on techniques that encrypt private messages from a sender (Alice) which
can only be decrypted by the receiver (Bob) and not by any adversary (Eve). Symmetric
cryptographic methods need an a priori exchange of secrets such as encryption keys and
authentication keys between Alice and Bob.1 Asymmetric cryptography has been a major
revolution in cryptography by overcoming the key distribution problem and allowing the
encryption of messages to Bob with whom Alice does not yet share a secret. Asymmetric
cryptography methods such as RSA and Diffie-Hellman key exchange use secret private keys
(known only to its owner) together with public keys for security and thus overcome the
necessity of a priori sharing a secret.2,3
The existing asymmetric cryptography methods face two issues. Firstly, they are not
information-theoretically secure, i.e. the security relies on unproven mathematical assump-
tions such as the hardness of factorization or the computation of discrete logarithms. Sec-
ondly, digitally stored private keys are prone to stealthy copying (which is not detected by
the key owner), thereby compromising the security. Over the last three decades, quantum
physics has been exploited to create unconditionally secure cryptography methods such as
Quantum Key Distribution,4–6 Quantum Key Recycling,7–9 Quantum Secret Sharing,10 and
Quantum Secure Direct Communication.11,12 These methods utilize entanglement or the un-
clonability of unknown quantum states to avoid leakage of information to Eve or to detect
Eves actions. Nevertheless, the practical implementation of these quantum methods again
requires an authentication mechanism on the communication channel between Alice and
Bob to prevent Eve from impersonating Bob. The standard approach for achieving this
remains a priori sharing of a secret key, which to a large extent defies the purpose of a key
exchange method. Indeed, public keys based on quantum states have been proposed as a
way to fulfill all the security criteria.13,14 However, the use of quantum states as public keys
is highly impractical, since it requires long-term quantum storage, and has limited scalability
in the number of keys.13 Hence, there is still need for a practical asymmetric cryptographic
method.
An important ingredient for a new cryptographic method are physical unclonable keys
(PUKs), also known as physical unclonable functions (PUFs), which have been used as
authentication tokens.15–18 A PUK is a physical object with complex internal structure
that is infeasible to copy due to the massive number of degrees of freedom that strongly
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FIG. 1. PEAC Concept. Using a SLM, Alice creates few-photon wavefronts that focus to one
of the highlighted regions in the transmission of Bobs PUK. The wavefronts are constructed as
superposition of wavefronts known to focus to a spot in the detector area, indicated as gray dots.
Photons in the highlighted yellow or blue spots are collected by a multimode fiber (core diameter
indicated by the red circle) and detected on an avalanche photodiode D0 (0) or D1 (1), respectively.
The received bit value is decided based on the difference in the number of photodetections in the
two detectors.
affect its response to stimuli. PUKs that can be read out optically are readily realized in
opaque scattering media (e.g. white paint, teeth and paper), which consists of vast numbers
of randomly positioned particles. A recent development, Quantum Secure Authentication
(QSA), verifies the authenticity of an optical PUK by querying it at the few-photon level.18,19
The security of QSA relies only on the hardness of cloning the PUK or its optical response.
Here we combine PUKs and quantum cryptography: We introduce PUK-Enabled Asym-
metric Communication (PEAC) that allows Alice to quantum-encrypt a message on few-
photon wavefronts, which can be decrypted only with Bobs PUK. The security of PEAC
does not rely on mathematical assumptions or on the secure storage of secrets, but only on
the hardness of distinguishing complicated high-dimensional quantum states. Importantly,
PEAC requires only a one-way quantum communication channel between Alice and Bob.
Similar to many asymmetric cryptography methods, PEAC works with a public-private
key pair. The private key is the infeasible-to-copy PUK held by Bob. The optical challenge-
response characteristics of Bobs PUK are utilized to form the digital public key. The public
key is generated through a one-time optical characterization of the PUK as follows. A
plane wave of light is programmed with the help of a digital Spatial Light Modulator (SLM)
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using complex wavefront shaping or digital phase conjugation in a setup illustrated in Fig.
1.20–23 The SLM offers K degrees of freedom in shaping the wavefront, i.e., K independent
phases can be programmed. The wavefronts are constructed such that the light transmitted
through the PUK is focused to different locations, illustrated as the grid in the right panel of
Fig. 1 (see Appedix A for details on experimental methods; Fig. 4, 5). Each distinct focus
corresponds to a linearly independent incident field (wavefront). We separate the incoming
wavefronts into two sets, each focusing to one of the highlighted regions in Fig. 1, and assign
them as the bases H0 and H1 for transmitting classical bits 0 and 1, respectively. The two
sets H0 and H1 together constitute the public key.
When any sender (for instance, Alice) wants to send a bit b to Bob, they run the following
procedure. Alice chooses as a random superposition ψ of fields in Hb(b ∈ {0, 1}) and
programs it in the SLM. A pulse of weak coherent light with low mean photon number 〈n〉
is patterned by the SLM and transmitted over the quantum channel to Bob. The quantum
channel from Alice to Bob should be multimodal, with a capability to transmit K spatial
modes. The requirement of low 〈n〉 provides the security from eavesdropping thanks to
quantum physical principles (discussed below). Bob uses two single-pixel detectors D0 and
D1 that register the integrated photodetections over the areas corresponding to the spaces
H0 and H1, respectively. The value of the received bit corresponds to the region with the
maximum photodetections. The contrast between the signal in the detectors is high with a
perfect concentration of light into the chosen area. However, practical limitations such as
the noise in the source and the detectors and an incomplete control of the transmitted field
result in a reduced contrast. Further, the partial transmission of the incident light by the
PUK (≈ 10%) leads to photon loss. The noise and losses lead to errors in the transmission of
symbols from Alice to Bob, which necessitates error correction to make PEAC a functional
communication scheme.
Our choice of error correction is guided by the level of channel noise. This can be quanti-
fied by the channel parameters shown in Fig. 2(A). The parameters α and  characterize the
bit-flip and bit-loss probabilities of the channel. The probability for a bit to be transmitted
correctly is (1 − )(1 − ). At 〈n〉 = 33 photons per wavefront with K = 900 degrees of
freedom on the SLM, we find α = 0.43±0.01 and  = 0.59±0.01. These channel parameters
were estimated by transmitting 215 pseudo-random bits from Alice to Bob. The error rate
α is plotted as the red star in Fig. 2(B). To overcome the channel noise, we employ polar
5
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FIG. 2. Communication channel. (A) Possible bit transmission outcomes: Correct transmission
(solid green), loss (dotted purple) or flip of the bit (dashed red) are quantified by the two variables
 and α,which correspond to bit loss and flip probabilities respectively. (B) the code rate R as a
function of the maximum A→B error rate after application of the polar code (black squares right
and left of the star, resp.). The channel error rate is estimated by transmitting 215 bits, each
carrying data i.e. code rate R = 1, over a channel with  = 0.59 and α = 0.43 (red star). We
design an error-correcting polar code for a codeword of length N = 215 transmitted over N virtual
channels. Simulations confirm the possibility to achieve bit error rate < 10−4 for a code rate of
R ≈ 0.002, i.e. M = R ·N ≈ 26 low-error decoded bits.
codes, which have been proven to be capacity-achieving.24 Conceptually, polar codes can re-
liably transmit M bits of data by encoding them into a codeword of N bits (N > M). The
other N −M bits in the codeword are preassigned to a known value and encoded with M
data bits into an N bit codeword. The operation of polar codes can be formulated through
the construction of N virtual channels with M of them carrying data reliably. The ratio
R ≡M/N , called the code rate, quantifies the amount of information that can be transmit-
ted. The achievable R for a given channel is upper bounded by the channel capacity. Polar
codes comprise an encoder-decoder system, which polarizes the M data channels to have a
vanishingly small error rate. This improvement of the error rate in the data channels occurs
at the cost of an increased error in the N −M constructed noisy channels. Increasing the
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〈n〉Mean number of photons per wavefront〈n〉Mean number of photons per wavefront
Expected photodetections
FIG. 3. Security. (A) Measured number of photodetections per millisecond in the correct sym-
bol with varying mean photon number 〈n〉 (magenta circles). The measured mean number of
photodetections (error smaller than the circle size) agrees well with the estimated number of pho-
todetections for an incident Poisson source with n photons (red curve). We operate well above the
detector dark counts of 0.03 per millisecond (black dotted curve). Eves probability PEve to guess
the correct bit value is depicted as the blue dashed curve. Lower PEve results in a higher level of
security as highlighted with the darker shading. (B) depicts the channel capacity between Alice
and Bob IAB (red curve) and between Alice and Eve IAE (black curve) as a function of 〈n〉. The
secrecy capacity C = IAB − IAE is also plotted (blue dotted curve) and reaches its maximum at
〈n〉 = 33.
codeword length N for a fixed M improves the error rate of data channels but results in a
lower communication speed, i.e. smaller R. Figure 2(B) shows the maximum error rate of
the virtual channels in a codeword with N = 215 (shown as black squares) estimated using
simulations based on density evolution methods.25 A code rate R = 2−9 ≈ 0.002 can be used
with this codeword length to maintain a practical limit of bit error rate (BER) < 10−4 (blue
dashed line) for message transmission using polar coding (see Appendix C; Fig. 7).
The security of PEAC relies only on one assumption: the quantum-physics-imposed dif-
ficulty of determining the used subspace H0 or H1 for ψ at low photon number 〈n〉. Given
that this assumption holds, the most generic attack by Eve is to estimate ψ and infer the
most likely subspace used in its construction. The most powerful state estimation is known
to yield a fidelity F = (〈n〉 + 1)/(〈n〉 + K),26 from which we calculate the probability for
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Eve to correctly guess the subspace to be
PEve ≤ 1
q
+
〈n〉
K
K − 1
K + 〈n〉 (1)
Here, q is the number of subspaces; in our implementation q = 2. In the limit K/〈n〉 → ∞
,i.e. 〈n〉  K,PEve → 1/2, which corresponds to a random guess. We define the security
parameter S ≡ K/〈n〉 to quantify the security, with S > 1 resulting in PEve < 1. Figure 3
shows the measured photodetections in the correct detector with varying 〈n〉. The baseline
photodetections are the detector dark counts which impede Bobs measurements at lower 〈n〉.
At 〈n〉 = 33, i.e. S ≈ 27, the mean number of photodetections in the correct and wrong
detector are 0.35 and 0.27, respectively. At S ≈ 27, PEve = 0.53, very close to a random
guess. The information shared between Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve can be quantified in terms
of the channel capacities for Alice-Bob, IAB, and Alice-Eve, IAE, as shown in Fig. 3(B)
(see Appendices for details). The secrecy capacity for the communication of information
between Alice and Bob is C = IAB − IAE. When C > 0, the information shared between
Alice and Bob is higher than that between Alice and Eve. In this scenario, standard privacy
amplification techniques can be utilized to reduce Eves knowledge to practically zero. The
error-correcting code has to be tuned such that the Alice→Bob noise is corrected but not
the Alice-Eve noise. To ensure secure and error-free transmission of data between Alice
and Bob, the designed polar codes should achieve BER < 10−4 for the Alice→Bob channel
and an extremely noisy Alice→Eve channel (ideally BER = 0.5). In our implementation
with C = 0.003, we succeeded in designing a polar code with R ≈ 0.002 that concurrently
achieves an Alice→Bob BER < 10−4 and Alice→Eve BER > 0.12 (see Appendix C; Fig.
8). After the error correction step, Eves partial information is reduced to zero using privacy
amplification. Note that we assume the worst-case scenario in which Eve intercepts all the
signal photons from Alice with perfect detectors. In contrast, the BER for the Alice→Bob
channel is estimated for the imperfect detection (54%) and collection (50%) efficiencies of
the PUK transmission achieved in our setup.
In conclusion, we demonstrate an asymmetric encryption scheme that does not require
storage of any digital secrets. Its security is derived only from quantum physics and the
technological infeasibility to make an optical device that copies the complex optical behavior
of the physical key of the receiver. It can be deployed stand-alone or in tandem with classical
cryptography; the latter case yields a strong multi-factor encryption with unprecedented
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security features. The proposed scheme can be readily implemented with available hardware,
making it highly attractive for short-term realization. An important aspect in the physical
realization of optical PUKs is the sensitivity of their optical response to environmental
conditions. Optical PUKs that are robust against mechanical and thermal variations in
the environment can be realized in ceramics, electrochemically-etched gallium phosphide
and through laser micromachining of glass.27,28 PEAC can be extended to long distance
communication by utilizing multimode fibers as transmission channels, which are currently
employed for wavefront shaping and imaging.29,30
Appendix A: Materials and Methods
0 1
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FIG. 4. Experimental setup. The schematic of the experimental setup employed in PEAC
is shown here. The incoming weak coherent light (vertically polarized) with an average photon
number 〈n〉 is shaped using a liquid crystal spatial light modulator (SLM). The wavefront shaped
light is transmitted to Bob located at 2 m distance. The received light is focused on Bobs PUK
composed of zinc oxide (ZnO) nanoparticles. The multiple-scattered light transmitted through the
PUK is collected by a microscope objective. The horizontal and vertical polarization components
in the transmitted light are separated using a polarizing beam splitter (PBS) and coupled into
separate multimode fibers (200 µm core diameter) attached to photodetectors D0 and D1.
The experimental setup used in the implementation of PEAC is shown in Fig. 4. The
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wavefront of vertically polarized weak coherent light (λ = 790 nm; Coherent Mira) is shaped
using a phase-only spatial light modulator (SLM; Hamamatsu X10468-02) divided into 900
segments. Each segment consists of a 10×10 pixel group. The shaped wavefront is transmit-
ted to Bob over a 2 m free-space channel. Bob uses a microscope objective (Zeiss 63x/0.95
NA) to focus the light onto the PUK. The PUK is a spray-painted slab (thickness 13 ± 1
µm) of zinc oxide (ZnO) nanoparticles on a 170 µm thick glass substrate.18 The light incident
on the PUK is multiple-scattered as a result of the large thickness of the slab in comparison
to the transport mean free path (`tr = 0.7 ± 0.2µm). The multiple scattering scrambles
the spatial modes and polarization of the incident light in transmission and reflection of the
PUK, giving rise to a complex speckle pattern. The transmission speckle, comprising of Ns
spatial modes, is collected using a second microscope objective (Zeiss 64x/0.95 NA), which
collects a fraction f of the spatial modes. The three-dimensional multiple scattering of the
incident light by the PUK results in an equal number of spatial modes in the horizontal
and vertical polarization. We employ a polarizing beam splitter (PBS), to spatially separate
the transmitted light into fNs/2 horizontally-polarized spatial modes and fNs/2 vertically-
polarized spatial modes to achieve the spatial separation into orthogonal components (to
be able to separate them easily without the detector fibers getting into each others way)
required for PEAC as illustrated in Fig. 1. The bases H0 and H1 are chosen such that
the transmitted light through the PUK focuses in either horizontal or vertical polarization,
respectively. The cardinality of the union of basis sets should be close to the number of
control channels, i.e. |H0 ∪H1| ≈ K.
In the one-time optical characterization stage of the PUK, the spatially separated trans-
mission of laser light (λ = 790 nm; power = 1 mW) is imaged onto two identical CCD
cameras. The SLM is programmed using an iterative wavefront-shaping algorithm to focus
to distinct locations on the CCD.20–23,31–33 The set of programmed SLM wavefronts for the
distinct locations in the horizontal and vertical polarizations realize the bases H0 and H1,
respectively.20,31 If the neighboring locations on the CCD are within the optical memory
effect range of the PUK, the SLM patterns will have non-zero correlations.34–36 We ensure
minimal correlations between the basis patterns by selecting the largest subset of wavefronts
with maximal Hamming distance ( = K, the number of SLM segments) to all basis wave-
fronts. After the characterization, the CCD cameras are replaced by lens-coupled multimode
fibers (200 µm core diameter). The multimode fibers capture the whole speckle pattern and
10
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FIG. 5. Basis patterns. (A) shows the one-time construction and calibration of the basis wave-
fronts of the PUK. The integrated intensities in detectors D0 and D1 are plotted for all the basis
wavefronts of H0 and H1 patterned on the wavefront of coherent light using the SLM. (B) shows the
contrast with weak coherent states with 100 different random superpositions of basis wavefronts,
first 50 from H0 and the rest 50 from H1, are incident on the PUK.
the integrated intensity or photodetections over the area is measured using photodiodes or
avalanche photodiodes (D0 and D1) respectively. Figure 5(A) shows the measured photodi-
ode reading with laser light when different patterns from bases H0 and H1 are incident on
the PUK. A signal contrast, i.e. [1(correct detector signal)/(wrong detector signal)] · 100%,
of > 20% (varies between 20% − 53% for different basis wavefronts) is observed across 350
independent patterns per basis. When random superpositions of the basis patterns are
transmitted using weak coherent light, an average contrast of 30% in the photodetections is
observed as shown in Fig. 5(B).
The choice of spray-painted ZnO nanoparticles for PUK in our experiment arises from
the ease in fabrication of multiply scattering material. However, the position of the nanopar-
ticles in the ZnO slab is sensitive to small temperature variations, which becomes visible in
the speckle pattern. The multiple scattering of light in the PUK is highly sensitive to the
exact position of the nanoparticles.36,37 Multiple scattering media fabricated through elec-
trochemical etching of gallium phosphide and laser micromachining of glass can be employed
for PUKs that are robust against environmental fluctuations.
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Appendix B: Security analysis
We analyze the security of PEAC under the following assumption. It is infeasible to realize
an optical device that projects any wavefront ψb ∈ Hb to symbol b. Eve has knowledge of
Bob’s public key and the details of the symbol encoding scheme used by Alice and Bob.
In this case, the most generic attack is to estimate the state ψ and infer the most likely
subspace used in its construction. The most powerful state estimation method is known to
yield a fidelity F ≤ (〈n〉+1)/(〈n〉+K), where 〈n〉 is the mean photon number per wavefront
and K is the number of degrees of control on the SLM.26 Let ψˆ denote Eves estimator for
ψ. Then F = |〈ψˆ|ψ〉|2. Let the correct subspace Hx, with x ∈ {0, 1, . . . , q − 1}, be spanned
by an orthonormal system {ψ, v2, v3, , vK/q}. Averaged over random PUKs, the probability
for Eve to correctly guess x is given by
PEve = |〈ψˆ|ψ〉|2 +
K/q∑
j=2
|〈ψˆ|vj〉|2
= F +
K/q∑
j=2
|〈ψˆ|vj〉|2
≤ F +
K/q∑
j=2
1
K
≤ 1
q
+
〈n〉
K
1− 1
K
1 + 〈n〉
K
.
Here we have used F ≤ (〈n〉+1)/(〈n〉+K) and |〈ψˆ|vj〉|2 ≤ 1/K. The latter inequality holds
because an unconstrained average over the random vectors |vj〉 in the K-dimensional space
would yield 1/K, whereas our average excludes the favorable direction ψ. The binary case
realized in our experiments can be retrieved by setting q = 2. For 〈n〉  K, PEve → 1/q,
which is equivalent to a random guess of the correct basis.
Using the above result, we can calculate the channel capacity between Alice and Eve IAE
to be
IAE = 1− h(PEve),
where the binary entropy function is h(x) = x log2 1x+ (1− x) log2 1((1− x)). The channel
capacity for a binary symmetric erasure channel between Alice and Bob IAB can be written
using the channel parameters  and α as
IAB = (1− )(1− h(α)).
12
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FIG. 6. Polar codes. (A) A binary channel W maps X to Y . The channel has a capacity
I(W ). (B) Polar coding comprises a preprocessing stage (Encoder) which combines data bits
D1, D2, . . . , DM with frozen bits (say, set to 0) to create the code word X1X2 . . . XN . The trans-
mitted code word is received as Y1Y2 . . . YN . The good channels of the decoder are identified a
priori and the data bits D1, D2, . . . , DM are read out by the receiver.
Appendix C: Polar codes
Polar codes are linear block-error-correction codes, which are mathematically proven to
be capacity achieving for memoryless binary channels.24 Lets consider a binary channel W
which maps input X ∈ {0, 1} to output Y with channel capacity I(W ) = I(X;Y ), see
Fig. 6(A). Conceptually, given N copies of the binary channel W , polar codes synthesize N
virtual channels W
(i)
N (i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}), such that the channels with indices from a set F
are bad (completely noisy with I(W
(i)
N )→ 0,∀i ∈ F ) and the channels with indices from the
complement of set F are good (nearly noiseless with I(W
(i)
N )→ 1,∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}\F ) i.e.
the virtual channels are polarized. In the limit of N → ∞, the fraction of good channels
approaches the channel capacity I(W ), i.e. the Shannon bound. Information is transmitted
over the good channels, while fixed values (frozen bits) known both at encoder and decoder
are assigned to the bad channels.
Polar codes are channel-specific codes, where the selection of good channels is a critical
step for polar coding. The polar codes are designed by estimating and ranking the reliability
of the polarized channels. This involves the optimization of the encoder and the decoder.
The encoder combines the data bits with frozen bits (say, set to 0) and prepares a code
13
word. An (N,M,F ) polar code can transmit M data bits as an N -bit long codeword
X = X1X2 . . . XN with |F | frozen bits using the following mapping:
X = uGN ,
X = uF cGN(F
C) + uFGN(F ),
where F are the set of indices of the frozen bits, FC = {1, 2, . . . , N}\F are the information
bit indices, u = {u1, u2, . . . , uN} are the uncoded bits and GN is the encoding matrix. The
notation GN(F ) denotes the submatrix of GN formed by the rows with indices in F . The
encoding matrix GN is defined as follows:
GN = G
⊗N
2 ,
G2 =
1 0
1 1
 ,
where A⊗N is the N times Kronecker product of A. The encoded bits are received as the
noisy codeword Y = Y1Y2 . . . YN , which is decoded using the successive cancellation list
(SCL) decoding as v1v2 . . . vN .
38 The M data bits D1, D2 . . . DM can be read out from the
decoded bits at the good channels.
In our implementation, we design polar codes for N = 215 with a code rate R ≡ M/N
chosen to maximize the secret message rate between Alice and Bob, while ensuring maximal
error for an eavesdropper. To this end, we construct the encoder and decoder for the
channel between Alice and Bob with the channel parameters α = 0.43 and  = 0.59. The
reliability of the N polarized channels is quantified using the error rate pe of each polarized
channel, which is estimated through simulations. The simulations utilize density evolution
methods to estimate the reliability of the Alice→Bob (A-B) and the Alice→Eve (A-E)
channels at the encoder.25 The information block, i.e. the set of message bits, is assumed to
have 16 embedded CRC (cyclic redundancy check) bits. We utilize a CRC-aided Successive
Cancellation-List decoder (SCL) with list size of 32.38 The Alice→Eve channel has the
channel parameters α = 0.46 and  = 0, which are estimated using Eq. (1) assuming Eve
intercepts all the signals from Alice and measures using perfect detectors. Further, Eve also
has knowledge about the polar code design used by Alice and Bob, in addition to Bobs public
key. Figure 7(A) shows the number of polarized channels with the error rate pe. The error
rate pe is an upper bound on the error rate of each polarized channel, which was estimated
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FIG. 7. Reliability and security of the polarized channels. (A) shows the number of
polarized channels with an error rate pe for N = 2
15 = 32768 virtual channels. The error rates
for the symmetric lossy channel between Alice and Bob with alpha = 0.43 and  = 0.59 and the
binary symmetric channel between Alice-Eve with α = 1 − PEve = 0.47 and  = 0 are plotted as
black squares and red circles, respectively. (B) illustrates the partial overlap of reliable polarized
channels (i.e. pe < 10
−4) between Alice-Bob and between Alice-Eve. The area of the shaded
regions is proportional to the channel capacities. The overlap can be reduced by selecting a subset
of secure and reliable polarized channels for secret message transmission between Alice and Bob.
using a density evolution method. At lower error rates, the ratio of the number of Alice-Bob
to Alice-Eve reliable channels is seen to increase.
We consider the channels with pe < 10
−4 as reliable, i.e. good. As illustrated in Fig.
7(B), error correction will also allow Eve to decode using her reliable channels, with a
fraction of them common between Bob and Eve. This will result in a loss of secrecy in the
communication. We overcome the loss of secrecy by imposing a constraint on the choice of
the reliable channels in the design of the polar code. The selection of secure reliable channels
is made such that the Alice→Bob polarized channels have an error rate pABe < 10−4 with the
constraint that the Alice→Eve channel error rate pAEe > 10−2. This results in a reduction
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FIG. 8. Polar code performance. (A) depicts the BER in the message decoded by Bob (filled
symbols) and by Eve (open symbols) with varying R. We plot the estimated BER in communication
when utilizing all the reliable channels (black squares) and when utilizing only the secure and
reliable channels (green circles and red star) for different constraints on the Alice→Eve error rate.
(B) depicts the frame error rate FER with varying R for the corresponding polar codes as shown
in (A). Note that all the three curves for the Alice→Eve channel are on top of each other at FER
= 1.
of the number of reliable channels for transmitting message bits, i.e. a lower code rate R,
but with minimal overlap of reliable channels between Bob and Eve.
The performance of the designed polar codes is shown in Fig. 8(A) as the bit error rate
(BER) of the data bits with varying R. The BER is simulated by using a CRC-aided SCL
decoding algorithm. A BER < 10−4 for the Alice→Bob channel is achieved for R < 0.003
with an unconstrained polar code design. We estimate the BER for the Alice→Eve channel
to be > 0.05 for this design. By imposing the reliability constraint in the selection of
polarized channels, the polar codes achieve a BER for the Alice→Eve channel of > 0.12
and for the Alice→Bob channel of 10−5 at a lowered code rate R ≈ 0.002. Imposing an
even stricter constraint in the selection of secure reliable channels to ensure that the BER
of Alice→Eve channel is 0.50 will further lower the code rate, which can be prohibitive for
communication. To understand the disparity in the information shared between Alice and
Bob and Alice and Eve in a codeword transmission scheme as used here, it is necessary to
consider the frame error rate FER, i.e. probability of having at least one bit error in the
16
decoded message. The FER for the designed polar codes is shown in Fig. 8(B). At R ≈ 0.002,
the FER of Alice→Bob channel is < 10−4 for both the constrained (pAEe > 0.001) and the
unconstrained polar code. The FER for the Alice→Eve channel is 1, which demonstrates
that for the selected code rate R ≈ 0.002, the polar codes efficiently correct errors only on
the Alice→Bob channel.
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